The portfolio came out of its operator transition carrying a fee structure set by the previous operator, running at 76.7% of rent against a market near 31%. Within weeks of Pacer flagging it, the Long Valley team green-lit a full rebuild across more than 100 homes. Total guest revenue rose 7.2%, occupancy rose 1.8 points, and $141,829 of the same guest spend moved from fees into owner earnings.
When a portfolio changes hands, the fee structure usually comes with it. Long Valley inherited one built years earlier by the previous operator: a per-night damage waiver, cleaning fees that varied widely between comparable homes, and separate pet and hot tub charges. In 2025 those fees ran at 61.7% of rent while the surrounding market sat at 29.8%, and by March and April of 2026 the portfolio was at 76.7% against a market at 31.3%.
Nothing about that was an operator decision. It was accumulated structure, and it is genuinely difficult to see from the inside without a market comparison to hold it against. What separates this portfolio is what happened once it was visible: Alex, Susan and the Long Valley team took the finding seriously, made the call quickly, and pushed a rebuild through more than 100 homes in the middle of their booking season. Most operators would have deferred that to the off-season.
"The revenue management strategy helped us gain trust with our owners after a somewhat tumultuous transition. We feel confident that Pacer is the best partner to help us achieve our goals."
Pacer presented the fee strategy audit on May 12 and the cleaning rebuild six days later. Long Valley approved and implemented it in-season. From that point the fee load fell in a straight line, from 77.7% in March to 35.7% in July, closing most of the distance to the market. The prior year moved the opposite direction over the same months, which is what happens when nobody touches it.
Fees and tax as a percentage of rent, 83-home same-store cohort, night-allocated from PriceLabs. Market reference from Key Data comp sets in the May 12 audit. The 2025 line shows the same months a year earlier, when the fee load rose into peak season rather than falling.
Not a blanket discount. Cutting fees is easy and usually just moves the loss somewhere else. The work was to rebuild each charge against what it actually costs to deliver, so owners earn more, guests see a cleaner price, and the operator keeps the margin it needs to run the business.
The guest cleaning fee averaged $172 against a contractor departure rate of $128. Pacer reset the fee to the true cost of the clean. That cut the guest charge 26% while still sitting 28% above the operator's own departure piece rate, so Long Valley keeps its margin on every turn.
A model fee was set for each bedroom class with a 30% band for occupancy and square footage, replacing outliers where a 2-bedroom carried a higher fee than a 3-bedroom in the same town.
The inherited waiver was charged per night. Combined with housekeeping it added 18.3% on top of nightly rent. Pacer moved it to a per-stay basis, the single largest driver of the reduction.
OTA markups were set above what distribution actually costs. Pacer reset them to cost: VRBO from 10% to 8%, Airbnb from 20% to 15.5%. Pet and hot tub fees were folded into the nightly rate rather than charged separately.
The operator's economics improved alongside the owners'. Management fees are earned on rent, so moving $141,829 out of pass-through fees and into rent raises what Long Valley earns on the same guest spend. Cleaning charges still cover the cost of the clean with margin above the operator's piece rate. Nobody funded this by absorbing a loss. Source: Pacer revenue strategy audit presented to Casago Long Valley and Treasure Valley on 2026-05-12, and the cleaning fee rebuild presented 2026-05-18.
The reasonable worry about cutting fees is that the business simply earns less. That is not what happened here. Total guest spend per night held steady, occupancy rose, and total revenue per available night finished 7.2% ahead. A cleaner checkout price brought more demand, and the portfolio kept the value it was already capturing.
A lighter fee load makes a listing cheaper at checkout without lowering the nightly rate, which is the most plausible reading of occupancy rising while spend per night held. Across the window the portfolio earned $66,158 more in total, or $797 per home, while the share reaching owners rose from 57% to 71%. Owners earned more, guests paid a clearer price, and the operator earned more on both.
This page measures total guest revenue, not rent alone, so the result cannot be an artifact of the fee restructure it describes.
Headline figures count everything the guest paid: rent, fees and tax. Rent is reported separately because it is what owner statements are paid from, not because it is the growth claim.
83 homes with booked nights in the May to July window in both 2025 and 2026, so every home was demonstrably active in both summers. Availability is identical across years, so revenue growth and RevPAR growth are the same figure.
Pacer went live 2026-03-01. March and April were transition months and are excluded from the headline. The performance window is May 1 to July 31 against the identical calendar window in 2025.
Revenue is night-allocated from PriceLabs for both years. The fee shift is corroborated in Guesty, which puts it at 73.7% to 42.2% on an 84-home cohort against PriceLabs' 75.4% to 40.2% on 83.
Fee strategy figures and market comparisons are drawn from the revenue strategy audit presented 2026-05-12 and the cleaning fee rebuild presented 2026-05-18. Cancellations excluded throughout. Figures as of August 21, 2026.
Pacer is a preferred revenue management partner to the Casago franchise network. We can benchmark your portfolio against bedroom-matched market performance and identify where revenue may be leaking, before you make any commitment.